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will be processed, 51 and stamp warnings on outgoing correspondence, 2 In
addition, the court suggests that, given the establishment of a proper set of
circumstances, courts may sanction the reading of inmate mail by prison
officials.58
Although these additional restrictions weaken the impact of the decision,
they cannot erase the constitutional constraints imposed upon prison officials
in connection with their overseeing of prisoner correspondence within the six
categories. It is not inconceivable that other courts will adopt the Fifth
Circuit two-fold approach of the right of access to the courts and the right
to enjoy free expression and petition for redress of grievances in their attempt
to resolve prisoner complaints. Whether these courts choose to expand the
applicability of this decision to other areas such as general public correspondence, press interviews, and visitation rights, remains to be seen. But whatever other courts decide, it is clear that the action of the court in Taylor,
in going beyond the Supreme Court's holdings in Martinez -and Wolff
and establishing a constitutional basis for protecting certain prisoner correspondence rights, should have a significant impact upon future prisoner rights
litigation.
Barry PaulHitchings

FEDERAL COURTS-Standing Conferred By Statufe-To Assert
Standing Under Statute, Plaintiff Must Trace Injury to
Defendant and Demonstrate that Favorable
Decision Will Provide Relief
Simon v. EasternKentucky Welfare Rights Organization,
-U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1976).
A class action suit was brought against the Secretary of the Treasury and

the Commissioner of Internal Revenue by several indigent individuals and
organizations representing such individuals. The plaintiffs asserted that the
51. Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 474, 482 (5th Cir. 1976).
52. Id. at 480.
53. Id. at 477. The Fifth Circuit does not clarify what it may consider a proper
set of circumstances. Other cases have presented situations where courts have permitted
prison officials to read prisoner correspondence. See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178,
201, (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Cox v. Crouse, 376 F.2d 824,
826 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 865 (1967); Baker v. Beto, 349 F. Supp.
1263, 1270 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Sands v. Wainright,
491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973); Conklin v. Hancock, 334 F. Supp. 1119, 1122 (D.N.H.

1971).
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Internal Revenue Service (IRS) violated the Internal Revenue Code and

the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing a ruling which classified
hospitals as tax exempt if the institutions provided only emergency medical
care free to indigents. The complainants argued that since the IRS no longer
defined a charitable hospital as one which provides full services without
charge to those unable to pay, the defendants were encouraging hospitals to
deny such services to indigents. In the district court defendants' motion to

dismiss included a challenge to plaintiffs' standing, but the court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs.' The court of appeals also found that
plaintiffs had standing but reversed the lower court's decision. 2 Both parties

petitioned for writ of certiorari. Defendants challenged the lower courts' decisions on the issue of standing to sue. Held-Vacated and remanded. To
assert standing conferred by statute, the plaintiff must trace the injury to the

challenged action of the defendant and demonstrate that a favorable decision
will provide relief.3

The concept of standing has been described by the United States Supreme
Court as a "complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction . . . . 4 One element of this doctrine is the limitation on federal jurisdiction embodied in the

United States Constitution:" the plaintiff must demonstrate a "case" or "controversy" between the defendant and himself to secure access to the federal

judicial system. 6 The second element of the concept of standing involves its
utilization as a rule of self restraint by the federal courts. 7 Plaintiffs lack

standing to challenge governmental actions considered by the court to be a
function of the executive or legislative branches and therefore not subject to
8
judicial intervention.
1. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 327
(D.D.C. 1973), rev'd sub nim. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, 506
F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 48
L. Ed. 2d 450 (1976).
2. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1291 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1976)
(revenue ruling upheld as not contrary to the Code).
, , 96 S.Ct.
3. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, - U.S.
1917, 1927, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 464 (1976).
4. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953) (suit by association of rural electric cooperatives and Secretary of Interior to set aside order granting license for dam). Generally, standing only becomes an issue when a citizen is
seeking judicial review of an administrative action or determination of the constitutionality of an action. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13, at 39 (2d ed. 1970).
5. Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides in part: "The judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, . . . under their Authority; . . .- to Controver-

sies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more
States ...... U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
6. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1974).
7. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
8. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 132 (1940) (prospective
bidders on government contract lacked standing to challenge administrative determina-
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The Court through the years has struggled to define standing precisely, but
commentators have felt that each time it is defined it becomes-more complicated. 9 To have standing to sue, the plaintiff must first show that he has
sustained an injury or is in immediate danger of sustaining one. 10 The questions that continually confront the Court concern the kind of interest which
is-worthy of protection and the type of injury that is required." The injury
has been described as the invasion of a legal right such as "one of property,
one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one
2
founded on a statute which confers a privilege."'
The Court has also recognized standing created by statutory enactment.' 8
In the Administrative Procedure Act, Congress created a right of judicial review for citizens detrimentally affected by agency action. 14 In Association

of DataProcessing Service Organizations,Inc. v. Camp,' 5 a two-pronged test

of standing under the APA was enunciated. 16 First, the challenged action
must have caused the plaintiff "injury in fact, economic or otherwise," and
second, the plaintiff's interest must be "arguably within the zone of interest
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question."'1 7 The decision in Data Processing exemplified the Court's expansion of the range of injuries cognizable to confer standing. 18 Liberalization
of the law of standing culminated with the case of United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP).' 9 There, five law
tion of wages which suppliers must pay); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464,
478-79 (1938) (competitors lacked standing to challenge loans to municipal corporations); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (taxpayer lacked standing
to restrain federal payments for maternity program).

9. See generally Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 493 (1974); Hasl, Standing
Revisited-The Aftermath of Data Processing, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 12, 40 (1973); Comment, Recent Standing Cases and a Possible Alternative Approach, 27 HASTINGS L.J.
213 (1975); Comment, Federal Standing-1976, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 383, 390 (1976).
10. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (injury must be different
and more direct than one shared by public in general).
11. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450, 468-71
(1970).
12. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).
13. E.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6 (1968) (competitor granted
standing to challenge power sales which violated statutory restrictions); FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940) (rival station challenged grant of license
to competitor station).
14. The Administrative Procedure Act states in part that "[a] person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
15. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
16. Id. at 152-53.
17. Id. at 152-53.
18. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (aesthetic injury to environment); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1970) (economic injury); Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) (injury to federal taxpayer).
19. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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students challenged a ruling of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
which allowed a surcharge on railroad rates. The petitioners claimed the order would result in discrimination against the hauling of recyclable goods and
thereby damage the environment. According to the students, such discrimination would increase the consumption of natural resources and result in the
proliferation of refuse and litter. The plaintiffs contended that their use and
enjoyment of the parks and natural surroundings in the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area would be harmed by the ICC ruling. The Court recognized that the line of causation between the agency action and the claimed
injury was "attenuated" but nevertheless found that the petitioners had standing. 20 The Court appeared to be recognizing the right of any citizen to challenge the actions of an administrative agency even though the claimed injury
21
was remote.
The trend of recent cases, however, has been toward a restriction of standing. 22 For example, United States v. Richardson23 held the claimant must
be in danger of suffering a "particular concrete injury" as a result of the challenged action. 24 Abstract injury or harm that is speculative was rejected by
the Court in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War 25 as insufficient injury in fact. 26 An injury shared by all citizens is, by definition, abstract, and unless a party can show some distinction between his position and
that of the group, he lacks standing. 27 The injury alleged must also be such
that judicial intervention will provide the plaintiff with a tangible personal
28
benefit.
Prior to the decision in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organi-

zation,'2 9 this restrictive tendency had not been applied in cases brought under
statutes conferring a right of review.3 0 In Eastern Kentucky the plaintiffs
20. Id. at 688.

21. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 162, at 476 (1976).
For discussions
advocating a liberal viewpoint regarding standing, see Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in
Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV.
1033 (1968); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 645 (1973).
22. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 528 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 239-40 (1974) (Marshall,

J., dissenting); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 237 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 509-12 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
23. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
24. Id. at 177 (plaintiff must demonstrate injury is not grievance common to gen-

eral public).
25. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
26. Id. at 217.
27. Id. at 220-21.
28. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
29. - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1976).
30. See, e.g., ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344, 1347-48 (9th Cir. 1975); Korioth
v. Briscoe, 523 F.2d 1271, 1275 n.11 (5th Cir. 1975); Ramer v. Saxbe, 522 F.2d 695,

700-03 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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claimed actual injury in the form of denial of access to hospital services and
argued that they were within the zone of interest protected by the statute. 81
The Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs had not established their standing and therefore could not challenge the IRS ruling.3 2
The Court recognized that judicial review was granted by the APA to any
citizen "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action," but held that the
threshold requirement for standing was "actual injury redressable by the
court."'3 3 The language of the decision indicates the Court's desire to limit
intervention of the judiciary in areas it considers reserved for the executive
or legislative branch. The Court spoke of "overstepping its assigned role"
should it adjudicate a case in which the plaintiff would not profit by a favor34
able decision.
What constitutes an actual injury cognizable under the APA was the main
question confronting the Court in Eastern Kentucky. The Court reasoned
that the injury suffered by the plaintiffs resulted from the actions of the hospitals and that such an injury by itself was not sufficient to meet the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement in an action brought against the de
fendants. 3 5 The plaintiff must allege some connection between his threatened or actual injury and the challenged agency action before a federal court
will intervene. 8 6
,In testing the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' allegations the Court reasoned
that any order to the IRS to enjoin the favorable tax treatment of the hospitals would not necessarily result in free medical care to the indigents.8 7
The plaintiffs' contention that the ruling encouraged the hospitals to deny ser31. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 1917, 1925, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 461-62 (1976).

U.S.

-,

-,

96 S. Ct.

32. Since the Court found the plaintiffs lacked standing, it did not find it necessary
to reach the defendant's other contentions. The defendants had argued that an IRS
ruling could not be challenged by a third party since this would be destructive of the

revenue system. The Court expressed no opinion in this regard. Id. at -,

96 S. Ct.

at 1923, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 459.
The defendants also characterized the action as barred by the Anti-Injunction Act,

26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1970), the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970),
and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

The lower court had rejected these arguments

but the Supreme Court did not reach these contentions.

Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare

Rights Organization, - U.S. -, -, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1924, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 460 (1976).
33. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, - U.S. -,
-,
96 S. Ct.
1917, 1924, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 460-61 (1976).

34. Id. at

-,

35. Id. at-,
36. Id. at -,

96 S. Ct. at 1925, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 461.
96 S. Ct. at 1927, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 462.
96 S. Ct. at 1925-26, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 462.

The Court pointed out

that no hospitals were defendants in the suit and that the claim regarding the failure

of the hospitals to supply indigent care was being pressed against officials of the Depart-

ment of the Treasury.

Id. at -,

96 S. Ct. at 1925, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 462. In his dissent-

ing opinion, Justice Brennan noted that such a claim did not present a cause of action

against the hospitals. Id. at -, 96 S. Ct. at 1932, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 470.
37. Id. at -, 96 S. Ct. at 1926, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 463.
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vice was termed "purely speculative" by the Court, as was any assumption
that an injunction against the ruling would result in delivery of free medical
care to indigents.38
In reaching its decision the Court relied on the principles expressed in
Linda R.S. v. Richard D.8 9 and Warth v. Seldin.40 In Linda R.S. the mother
of an illegitimate child sought a mandatory injunction requiring the district
attorney to prosecute the child's father for nonsupport. The mother contended that application of the statute in question to fathers of legitimate
children only was a violation of her constitutional rights. Standing was denied since the expectation that prosecution would result in payment of child
support was considered speculative. 41 In Warth standing was denied to
plaintiffs who sought to invalidate a restrictive zoning ordinance. The Court
concluded the complainants failed to demonstrate a specific concrete injury
resulting from the ordinance and failed to show that tangible personal bene42
fits would accrue from judicial intervention.
In Eastern Kentucky the Court took the position that remote possibilities
or speculative inferences would not satisfy the plaintiffs' burden of demonstrating the necessary connection between the injury and the challenged action. 43 Since the plaintiffs had not established that the ruling was responsible
for the denial of services or that an injunction would result in the delivery
of services, the injury was considered indirect and therefore speculative. The
Court ruled that indirect injury is 44
not fatal to standing but does make it more
difficult to meet the requirements.
The instant case was distinguished from United States v. SCRAP 45 on the
basis of the pleadings. The injury in SCRAP was regarded as indirect but
the complaint there, unlike that in Eastern Kentucky, "alleged a specific and
perceptible harm' 46 resulting from the ICC grant of the surcharge. 47 The
38. Id. at -, 96 S. Ct. at 1926, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 463. The Court held that the
allegation could support an inference that hospitals highly dependent on tax-deductible
donations might admit the plaintiffs if that charitable status was threatened but found
it speculative in the absence of additional evidence. Id. at -, 96 S. Ct. at 1926-27,
48 L. Ed. 2d at 463.
39. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
40. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
41. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973). The Court pointed out
that under the statute, the offense is completed when a support payment is missed, but
prosecution could result in a jail sentence rather than payment of child support. id.
at 618.
42. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 507-10 (1975).
43. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, - U.S. -, -, 96 S. Ct.
1917, 1927, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 464 (1976).
44. Id. at -, 96 S. Ct. at 1927, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 464.
45. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
46. Id. at 689 (claim was the loss of use and enjoyment of the natural environment
by the plaintiffs).
47. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, - U.S. -, -, 96 S. Ct.
1917, 1927 n.25, 48'L. Ed. 2d 450, 464 n.25 (1976).
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Court admitted in Eastern Kentucky that the line of causation between the
injury and the agency action was attenuated in SCRAP, but stated that it
could "fairly" be traced to the agency. 48 In Eastern Kentucky such a connection between the agency and the alleged injury could not be found by
the court. 49 The majority failed to find that a decision in favor of the plaintiffs would result in a change in the health care delivery practiced by the
hospitals. 50
In his dissent Mr. Justice Brennan vigorously attacked the distinction
drawn by the majority between the Eastern Kentucky and SCRAP cases, asserting that a comparison of the pleadings in each case failed to reveal sufficient distinguishing facts that would justify the majority's conclusion that the
SCRAP injury was more direct. 51 Mr. Justice Brennan asserted that the majority had practiced a "further obfuscation of the law of standing" by the extra injury dimension required by the Court.5 2 He argued that the constitutional minimum injury in fact required under a statute conferring standing
is a "personal stake sufficient to create concrete adverseness." 5 a
This decision will have a significant impact on actions brought under the
APA and other statutes which confer standing. Prior to its decision in Eastern Kentucky, the Court had been moving toward the position that injury
in fact should be the only test of standing.5 4 The two-prong test of Data
Processinghad commonly been the test applied by the courts in suits brought
under the APA, but the zone of interest requirement had been applied liberally in many instances."5 The decision in Eastern Kentucky will restrict the
injury in fact portion of the test by requiring the plaintiff to allege a specific
injury that directly flows from the challenged action and that appears upon
its face to be redressable by court decision. 56 Implicit is a requirement that
48. Id. at

-,

96 S.Ct. at 1927 n.25, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 464 n.25.

49. Id. at

-,

96 S. Ct. at 1927, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 464.

50. Id. at -, 96 S. Ct. at 1927-28, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 465.
51. Id. at -, 96 S. Ct. at 1936, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 474 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
52. Id. at -, 96 S. Ct. at 1928, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 465 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part). Mr. Justice Brennan agreed that the plaintiffs had not
met their burden of establishing that the ruling encouraged hospitals to deny services,
but would have granted summary judgment rather than dismiss on the basis of standing.

Id. at -,

96 S. Ct. at 1932, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 469 (Brennan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
53. Id. at -, 96 S. Ct. at 1933, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 471 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).

The often repeated "personal stake" phrase describing the

Constitutional minimum requirement for standing was first announced in Baker v. Cart,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
54. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. C. L. REv. 450, 471 (1970).
55. Hasl, Standing Revisited-The Aftermath of Data Processing, 18 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 12, 38 (1973).

56. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, Ct. 1917, 1927-28, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 464-65 (1976).
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the plaintiff demonstrate the probability that the defendant would act to the
plaintiff's benefit were a favorable decision rendered.
One problem with the decision in Eastern Kentucky is the burden placed
upon the plaintiff. He must not only demonstrate a connection between his
injury and the agency action but, in addition, must prove that a defendant
would behave in a particular manner if the requested relief were granted. 57
This is particularly difficult when, as in this case, a third party is involved.
Eastern Kentucky indicates that if the plaintiffs had been able to show that
the hospitals would have provided services had the revenue ruling been declared invalid, they would have been successful. 58 The question that remains, though, and the one which is perhaps the basis of Justice Brennan's
comment on "obfuscation," is what must be contained in the plaintiff's pleadings to show an injury considered to be redressable by the court.
The dissent points out that Congress often uses incentive-oriented legislation to achieve desired objectives.5 9 'Under the majority position a citizen
would have a difficult task if he challenged an administrative agency decision
that allegedly frustrated such desired objectives by rendering the incentives
offered by Congress to third parties meaningless. The party contesting the
agency action would be required under the Eastern Kentucky decision to demonstrate that the third party would react differently in the absence of such
incentives.
Arguments have been advanced for the position that minimum injury in
fact should be the only requirement for standing under the APA.6 0 It has
been argued that citizens today feel powerless in the face of federal bureaucracy, and therefore those aggrieved should be allowed liberal access to the
judicial system to challenge the agency action.61 Also, the administrative
agencies have been found to be susceptible to the influence of special interest
groups; if this be the case, then action through the courts would be the most
2
direct and effective attack.
The Supreme Court in Eastern Kentucky has extended the trend of Richardson, Reservists, and Warth toward restriction of standing. Even in actions
brought under the APA, the Supreme Court is restricting access to the federal
courts through the exercise of judicial restraint on the theory that many of
the differences between citizens and government are best handled through
57. Id. at -, 96 S. Ct. at 1926, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 463.
58. See id. at -, 96 S. Ct. at 1927-28, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 464-65.
59. See id. at -, 96 S. Ct. at 1937, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 475 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
60. See Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968); Scott, Standing in the Supreme
Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARv. L. REV. 645 (1973).
61. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1044 (1968).
62. Id. at 1044.
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